Review

India and China in Africa: Rivalry or catching up?

Lucien Nola Nouck

Department of International Relations and Conflict Resolution, Faculty of Laws and Political Science, University of Buea, Cameroon.

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The South-South cooperation has been experiencing a second youth with the deepening of Sino-Africa and Indo-Africa relations. In order to secure an important part of the Black continent’s enormous natural resources, China and India have pledged to build mutual beneficial partnerships with Africa. In the process, both Asian growing economies are infusing the continent with capital, infrastructure and jobs. If the two Asian drivers’ safaris in Africa mark the resurgence of Africa in international affairs after more than a decade of negligence by its traditional Western partners, the emerging South-South partnership being forged by both countries brand themselves as ‘win-win’ as compared to Western countries relationship with Africa. More, the Indian version, while refuting the idea of being engaged in a strategic rivalry with Beijing, stresses even more to distance itself from the Chinese type that is accused to be solely replicating the old colonial paradigm of the scramble of Africa’s raw material resources. This paper assesses the veracity of this assumption by confronting the Indian’s project main features to their Chinese counterpart through a cross-examination of key dimensions of both countries’ African project and highlights significant similarities as well as notable differences between these two approaches.

Key words: Rivalry, competition strategic partnership, south-south cooperation, China-Africa, India- Africa.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the emergence of China and India at the beginning of the 21 century represents one of the main strategic challenges for policymakers and academics around the globe. If people are fascinated by the concomitant emergence of both Asian giants, more are worried about the nature of their relation in the course of this emergence. Given the two countries highly conflicting history, one is wary of the capacity of both capitals to drive this exceptional phenomenon without rekindling historical tensions between them.

The similarity of the emergence path, namely growing and integrated economies at the global level, booming trade, military might and readiness with modernized nuclear capabilities as well as asserted regional and global diplomatic ambition, all indicates that Beijing and Delhi are poised to strengthen their rivalry. Yet, leaderships in the two countries do not see themselves as rivals. After Wen JiABAO, the former Chinese Premier, talking to journalists in Beijing declared « I hope you can send my message back to the great Indian people, that we’re not competitors, we are friends », Manmohan Singh, his Indian counterpart responded in Kuala Lampur few months later that « there is a misconception that India and China are competitors, and this is not true » Egretaue (2007). Still, observers find it difficult not to analyze both countries’ foreign

E-mail: lucienouck@gmail.com.

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engagement, notably in Africa or Central Asia with regard to access to natural resources, from the competition lens.

If African governments have warmly welcomed Beijing’s and New Delhi’s re-engagement on the continent, Chinese and Indian inroads in Africa have however created mixed responses from the African private sector and Western traditional partners of the continent. Many have claimed that through closer economic and trade ties characterized by a strong focus on resources, China is actually pursuing a neo-colonialist policy in Africa. India, has somehow partaken with tenets of this view in trying to brand its African ‘blueprint’ as more African development-oriented than the Chinese one.

China and India rushes in Africa are generally described as rooted in their ambition to secure natural resources, crucial inputs for maintaining their growing economies afloat. This is mainly explained by China’s transformation into a world workshop while India is seeking to follow the same path. It is equally linked to the nature of the globalization of economy that has put additional strains on resources access worldwide resulting in the normality of resources scarcity. Consequently, with Chen (2018) the quest for resources would inevitably lead to a clash for two mains reasons: resources security is considered highly fundamental to national interest while devising a strategy to achieve this goal must be given precedence over all others issues. For some proponents of this view, this situation has strengthened the resolve of the leaderships in both capitals to devote their efforts in favor of a new international order, the existing one being incompatible with their aspiration. As Mohan and Powell (2015:145) puts it, Beijing and Delhi henceforth have developed a “preference for regimes and empires rather than markets and institutions, and this preference seems to enable them to obtain energy resources without participating in international mechanism”.

This article looks at the China-India partnerships with Africa and reasserts that, while a possible military clash over the quest of resources in Africa cannot be totally ruled out, it is unlikely to happen taking into account three fundamental considerations rightly summarized by Calvin Chen (2018). First, natural resources being sourced from farther shores in foreign countries that can hardly be considered as being part of their natural zone of influence, neither Beijing nor Delhi can manage to achieve an access denial to the other. Consequently, it is only through partnerships characterized by a smart use of economic assets and others soft power tools that China and India can secure permanent access to African natural resources. Second, because of their asymmetrical capabilities, competition will remain prominent but cooperation wherever possible will prove less costly. Third, having integrated into their calculations that they will have to live with resources scarcity, like other countries do, in line with constraints imposed by globalization which has fundamentally limited the capacity of any country to freely maneuver on the global scene in building its most desirable ecosystem, policies within these two countries have therefore been readjusted accordingly. It is from this angle that we can better grasp the new orientation taken by Beijing in distancing itself progressively form highly energy-and-resources hungry industries while fostering investments in renewable energy where the country has become one the world leader in photovoltaic or in terms of electrical automobiles market. In India, similar reflections are taking place with bright prospects. This capacity of policy adaptation constitutes a buffer tool in dealing with uncertainties than can be used in limiting the chances of direct confrontation while striving to achieve energy security. This is what allows energy and mineral resources around the globe and particularly in Africa to be discovered and exploited sometimes by both Chinese and Indian investors.

This study contends that if it is obvious China factor is prominent in any single Indian move in Africa, for two reasons at least, the timing and, mostly, the nature and characteristics of both regimes, India is actually trying to catch up with China than actually competing against it. Regarding the timing, India missed to seize the opportunity of Africa’s opening and diversification to nontraditional partners (USA and Europe) in the early 90s. Calvin Chen explains that “although the falling-out between Western nations and Africa in the 1990s created an unanticipated opening for engagement, India, preoccupied with implementing and consolidating its economic reforms, delayed it outreach to Africa by nearly a decade” Chen (2018). At the same time, China while acknowledging the challenges associated with doing business in Africa (tough criticism from Western countries on its unwillingness to integrate good governance and human rights in its deals), has come to the conclusion that the benefits it can gain are by far more important that the perils. Thus, by the time Delhi finally launched its charm offensives, Beijing has already established a strong position on nearly all most lucrative oil and gas spots.

As for the nature and characteristics of both regimes, the type of government in charge at Delhi has seriously impeded Indian forays. As a parliamentary democracy borrowed from Britain, Indian authorities are under constant scrutiny form the opposition in the parliament and a vibrant civil society as well as a proactive and dynamic press, making it difficult to engage the country anyhow on the international arena. As India insists on maintaining a solid reputation as a responsible stakeholder in international affairs, it is reluctant to foster deals that would certainly yield economic gains but can contribute to tarnish its reputation abroad. It is therefore understandable why in 2005, for example, OVL actually outbid CNOOC for control of Nigeria’s Akpo field, but the Indian government blocked the agreement, wary of
political risk involved Chen (2018). The political risk here is the possible collusion with some Nigerian officials that, if eventually confirmed, had the potential to lead to a cabinet downfall.

Beijing does not have the same worries. As a centralized rule under the tight direction of the Chinese Communist Party, it virtually has nobody to report to. When priorities are set, the government just devises a strategy aiming at achieving the goal anticipated. In view of securing resources access in Africa, Beijing has opted to fill in the vacuum created by Western countries in a number of pariah states. In 1995 and 1996 China signed several deals with Nigeria after the military coup in 1993 and the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 8 fellow Ogoni activists in 1995 by the military regime of Sani Abacha ignited condemnation worldwide and prompted sanctions from the European Union and the USA. In another pariah state, China decided to engage Sudan and takeover Chevron’s stake in an oil concession secured in 1974 after the company was bound to leave the country in 1993 following Washington’s decision to suspend economic assistance after the military coup led by Omar el Bashir in 1989 and eventually its labelling in 1993 as terrorism state-sponsor. In 1995, CNPC inked an oil-development agreement with Khartoum while grasping three other development blocks through international auction. Where China pursues a complex-free real politics with regards to access to African mineral and energy sources in Africa, most of the time openly confronting Western partners and interests, India is concerned about avoiding ruffling feathers both within the country and in the West, and carries out a particularly cautious investment approach in this aspect.

A brief review of the concept of rivalry in international relations that helps us to ascertain whether China and India deepening engagement in Africa can only be viewed from a “rivalry” angle was followed. The study assessed the veracity of India’s above-mentioned assumption by confronting the Indian’s project main features to their Chinese counterpart through a cross-examination of key dimensions of both countries’ African project. Contrary to Delhi’s insistence in trying to differentiate its variant from the Chinese one, this study posits that both partnerships clearly share in common objectives and motives while the main difference rests with means implemented to carry them out.

RIVALRY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

States’ engagement on the international arena is often done in terms of rivalry. When one talks of rivalry, the military dimension immediately comes to mind. However, an analysis of rivalry shows that apart from the military confrontation, rivalry can equally be manifested in a wide range of interstate interactions. Therefore, understanding the characteristics of rivalry between states is of paramount importance. A comprehensive summary of the conceptualization of interstate rivalry is found in Chand (2019) drawing essentially from Thompson work.

In this article, we read that early assessments of rivalry focused on what is called “strategic rivalry”. In this perspective, the analysis of rivalry rested on recording the number of conflict’s occurrences between two states for a certain period. In their approach based on dispute density, Diehl and Goertz (2001) opine that two states are viewed as rivals if within a period of 20 years they record at least six military confrontations. Here, it is understood that military clashes are the very essence of rivalry. The problem with such an approach, as rightly observed by William and Thompson (2001), is that the analysis being restricted to a single unit, it fails to explain why certain rivalries do not necessarily lead to a military clash.

The termination of military actions being not necessarily synonymous to the extinction of the rivalry, another approach in characterizing rivalry lays emphasis on the notion of threat perception approach. Rival states are generally dyads endowed with similar capabilities where neither party is capable of imposing its views on the other without further fueling the conflict of interest. Here, rivalry is characterized by the conscious self-developed perception one state has about the other. For William and Thompson (2001), it entails a series of conflicts rather than an independent one that can develop mainly owing to the difficulty of two states to either share the same space (such as territorial dispute) or the same view regarding a particular issue within a particular context. Rivalry viewed through the lens of perceptions is therefore a constructed competition based on clashing interests.

A third way to look at rivalry deals with the nature of the rivalry with focus on two key dimensions: issues and military. Here rivalry is measured in terms of armed confrontations and threat perceptions, but equally based on specific issues. In this perspective, Mitchell and Thies (2011) have elaborated a two dimensional-measure: an issue-related dimension where the number of dyadic issues (geopolitical issues such as border disputes or water sharing disputes) at the diplomatic level are recorded and a military-related dimension that analyses the number of attempts to settle an issue through military action. This perspective presents a more balanced view of rivalry, for it does portray more than the sole military confrontation aspect of the concept. It clearly poses it that states competition is based on specific issues such as border disputes, regime survival, control over water resources, etc. Ignited from a single contentious issue, Mitchell and Thies (2011) believe rivalry progressively escalates to a multifaceted competition.

Can it therefore be said that each time two states compete over an issue or set of issues they are rivals? Rivalry requires more than that. Chand says no. To him, to be fully qualified as rivalry, the competition needs a “temporal proximity” which is “a thread that links the conflict/competition between the dyads”. For Mitchell and
Thies (2011), such a temporal proximity could encompass broader objectives at the strategic level namely regional influence or regional hegemony. It is to say that due to rivalry between two states, a contentious issue that arises in particular region of the world would span into broader issues leading consequently to a dyadic multifaceted issue-based rivalry. However, conflicting issues do not arise in a vacuum. They proceed from a specific historical context of the dyad. From this angle, rivalry goes far beyond military confrontation alone. It is actually, as Chand (2019) put it the commitment to “fighting for an issue that links competitions within a broader policy objective, be it regional hegemony or control over geopolitically significant possessions”.

Such a picture fits perfectly with the China-India dyad. Whenever one talks of China and India, it is actually the idea of ‘competition’ between both parties that immediately comes to mind highlighting an essentially hostile nature. In Africa, both “competing” parties have projected their ‘rivalry’ with the aim of securing privileged access to all types of resources for the sake of power and security at home and abroad likely to lead, where necessary, to a possible hegemony. This view corresponds to the realist or neorealist perspective of international relations that posits that competition is the key driver of interstate relations. In other words, if China-India strategic rivalry is understood as the will of one state to counter long-term strategic ambitions of the other state, it is clearly observed that rivalry is based not only on past bilateral clashes but rather on contentious and irreconcilable perceptions of the future. We can therefore say with Colaresi and Thompson (2001:275) that strategic rivalry involves interstate relations projection towards the future in essentially conflicting terms where past military standoffs are no longer a prerequisite.¹

CHINA AND INDIA DEPLOYMENT IN AFRICA

Similarities

China and India respective “strategic partnership” have objective and strategy in common.

Objectives

In the name of oil and metals

It is generally admitted that the current keen interest taken by both countries in Africa is driven by their ambition to secure access to raw materials and achieve national energy security in view of maintaining the current economic development pace on one hand and open up new markets for their cheap manufactured goods on the other. Of all African resources sought by both countries, oil is of paramount importance. From this perspective, one can understand why both capitals have embarked on aggressive oil diplomacy with the ambition to secure oil supplies for their growing domestic market on the short run while trying to position themselves as major players on the international oil market on the long run.

Actually, Chinese and Indian booming economies are extremely oil hungry and this has led to a profound reshaping of both international oil market and geopolitical setting. Industrialization and the subsequent raising of living standards have resulted in an exponential rise of oil demand. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2007), China and India will account for 43% of the global increase in oil demand between 2005 and 2030 while their combined oil consumption will increase from 9.3 to 23.1 mb/d during the same period. This represents an annual growth of 3.7%. Considering that the number of automobiles will continue to grow in both countries (from about 22 million in 2005 to more than 200 million in 2030 in China, and from 11 to 115 million in India), 2/3 of this oil demand will come from the transport sector.

Moreover, given low levels of production of Chinese and Indian oil fields combined with insignificant proven reserves, both countries will have to import more oil to satisfy this growing demand. China and India additional oil imports are projected to increase from 5.4mb/d in 2006 to 19.1mb/d in 2030, that is more than the current USA and Japan combined imports. The IEA goes further; the two Asian drivers will increasingly rely on oil to meet their energy needs knowing that it will represent 25% of India’s primary fuel demand in 2030, a 24% jump as compared to 2005, while in China it will progress from 19 to 21%. Lastly, as incomes continue to grow in China, per-capita oil demand will remain higher as compared to India. To conclude, the IEA predicts: “Oil will remain the main focus of attention for the Chinese and Indian governments in their efforts to address growing worries about energy security. This reflects both the prospect of a sharp increase in their import needs and the limited scope for switching away from oil products – especially in the transport sector”.

Meanwhile, hydrocarbons resources of Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) countries are also expected to experience a strong growth. In 2007, the total output of the top 10 SSA oil producers reached 5.6mb/d, out of which 5.1mb/d was exported. In 2030, this production is projected to reach 7.4mb/d from 6.4mb/d for export. Like today, Nigeria and Angola would continue to serve as locomotives of this train, as new producers join the club of oil producers IEA (2007).

China and India are then battling to get a pie of this amount of oil. China-Africa and India-Africa trade structures reveal that Beijing and Delhi top trading partners are oil-producing countries. In this regard, Muller-Kraenner (2008) believes the quest of energy security has fundamentally transformed both countries’ foreign policies, giving birth to a new “emerging foreign policy” that affects the existing geopolitical setting. In
order words, the Africa-ward oil diplomacy pursued by China in its “quest for energy security is more than simple economics. It is about China’s overall development strategy; the direction of China’s modernization program [and] what kind of China is emerging as world a power” Ian Taylor (2006). The same can be said about India.

As a result, China has succeeded in establishing itself as a major player in the African oil sector with strongholds secured in big producing countries such as Nigeria and Angola. Thanks to Chinese investment, Sudan has shifted from a net-oil importer to a net-oil exporter status in less than five years (1993-1997). China is equally searching for oil in medium scale producing countries such as Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea as well as in new producing countries like Ghana. We learn from IDE-JETRO (2009) that “today Chinese oil companies are operating in nearly 20 African countries in both the upstream and downstream sectors, and pose a significant strategic and economic challenge to both established majors and smaller independents, which for many years enjoyed unparalleled ascendancy in the continent’s energy sector.”

Africa is equally a significant source of meeting India’s energy security. In 2014, India sourced primarily its oil from Nigeria and Angola where Indian companies have secured some assets. Regarding gas, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea are among India’s top four suppliers. Today, Indian public sector company ONGC Videsh has established majors and smaller independents, which for many years enjoyed unparalleled ascendancy in the continent’s energy sector.”

In the name of new markets

Contrary to ‘Afro-pessimists’, India and China consider the continent as a market with higher potential for their manufactured goods. Africa, whose current population is around 1.3 billion in 2020 based on the latest United Nations estimates, is equivalent to 16.72% of the total world population and full of customers with various needs that both Asian economies look forward to satisfy. For this reason, China and India have been financially encouraging their respective companies to invest and capture market shares in Africa.

In the case of China, there are indications that the central government has played a prominent role in supporting state owned enterprises (SOEs) to direct FDIs in priority to Africa. Sautman and Hairong (2009) report that one senior Indian official have described Africa as “a land for outstanding business opportunities” while another called on Indian businessmen not to “shy away from risks” for “where risks are, rewards are there”. They were speaking at the India-Business partnership Summit jointly organized by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Federation of Indian Chambers and Commerce and Industry (FICCI) in January 2009.

The current volume of Chinese and Indian engagements across the continent suggests they are positive about the business environment as compared to other investors who are very critical about investment constraints, political stability and even physical security. According to a study carried out by McKinsey (2017), for two decades now, China has managed, from an initial insignificant role to become the Africa’s most important trading partner. In 2018, China exchanged with the continent for $185 billion up from $ 155 billion in 2017, a growth of nearly 20% per year. Foreign direct investment has even recorded a faster increase in the past decade with around 40% jump per year. These burgeoning ties are lifted by thousands of Chinese firms operating across the continent. McKinsey reveals that about 10 000 Chinese-owned firms are working in Africa in different sectors with 1/3 in manufacturing, 1/4 in services and 1/5 both in trade and in construction as well as real estate. More specifically, around 12% of the continent industrial production worth $500 billion in total per year is carried out by Chinese companies. In infrastructure, Chinese companies control almost half of the Africa’s construction projects awarded through international bidding processes. Moreover, Chinese businesses seem to be laying emphasis on responding to Africa’s market needs than on exports. By going beyond trading and contracting opportunities, the overall volume of investment carried out by these firms is an indication of their long-term engagement in Africa.

India, the second biggest growing economy in Asia, is also increasing its economic footprint in Africa. The Africa-India trade stood at $62 billion in 2018 with a notable 22% increase as compared to the previous year. Thanks to this rapid development in trade, India has become in 2016, Africa’s fourth most important trading partner even though China’s levels are almost three times higher than India’s ones. Africa’s main exports to India include crude oil, gold, coal and other minerals while Africa principally imports refined petroleum and pharmaceuticals that account for about 40% of total exports to African markets. Regarding FDI, in 2018, the overall investment in Africa stood at $54 billion, India with $15 billion was ranked the 4th biggest investor on the continent. Initially targeting principally Mauritius for obvious social and cultural ties, India’s investments have expanded to Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Kenya, Egypt and Tanzania as well as North African countries, to a lesser extent Samuel and Ihssane (2019:04). If Indian investment will continue to grow at a steady pace, they will however continue to lag behind those of others partners, namely China. As seen earlier that Chinese
firms are active in a various range of sectors, the structure of Indian imports from Africa suggests that New Delhi current economic engagement tend to be strongly resource-focused.

In the name of a new international order

Beijing’s engagement with Africa has a strong political dimension that is as important as the economic one. Over the past 15-20 years, China has been pursuing a proactive foreign policy. Shifting from its isolationism of the past and as a manifestation of its ambition to play a major role on world affairs, China has been expanding its bilateral diplomatic network, enhancing its involvement in multilateral organizations and joining regional organizations dealing with security and economic questions. This proactive engagement is seen in Beijing as a kind of “power multiplier”

Tull (2008) explains this foreign policy redefinition by three factors. First, owing to the economic success at home, China has become more confident in dealing with the external world. Pursuing an active foreign policy in this case helps to boost the prestige of the country. Second, China has learnt from the financial crisis that hit Asia in 1997 that regional and international stability are critical to the Chinese economy for it to continue to grow smoothly. In this context, only an active foreign policy can help to defend and protect national interests abroad. Third, because the US hegemony represents a serious threat to the “peaceful rise” of China as a global power, Beijing has developed the concept of “multi polar world” that consists in forging flexible alliances to counter the US hegemony and build a fair international order. By relying on these allies, primarily to be searched in the South, Beijing’s ambition is to allow itself more options in asserting its domestic and international interests. China’s engagement in Africa should therefore be viewed from this angle, not as a peculiar policy towards the continent, but rather as part of a global strategy similarly applied to other regions of the world (Latin America).

In practice, this results in notable benefits for the Chinese authorities. African countries represent an important reservoir of diplomatic support in international organizations with one country-one vote system, such as the UN Commission on Human Rights, where African votes have always proved crucial in barring successive western attempts to condemn China on human rights issues. It is also believed that African votes have helped China to win the hosting of prestigious international events such as the Olympic Games and the World Exposition. Finally, gathering African countries diplomatic support also serves the cause of the ‘One China Principle’ even though the Taiwan factor is less prominent today than a few years ago in the Chinese foreign policy regarding Africa. Yet, while the China-Taiwan competition is losing in intensity, another rivalry has come to fill the vacuum. The silent rivalry that is currently growing between China and Japan stems from Tokyo’s ambition to change its current status of economic giant and political dwarf. If Japan were to obtain a permanent seat in a reformed Security Council of the United Nations, Chinese influence in the region would automatically be significantly reduced. Knowing how critical African votes are in this issue, Tokyo is also stepping up its engagement with the continent. Its status of second largest donor to Africa allows it to use ODA as a formidable political tool to enhance visibility on the international scene.

India on its part is rather in search for an international recognition. In this line, it has assigned its foreign policy two major objectives: the reform of institutions of global governance and the preservation of a strategic autonomy, in other words, the building of an environment favorable to its development without being constrained by any global or regional power. For the first objective, India rightly considers that institutions such as the UN or financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank were established by developed countries to perpetuate their domination on world affairs. Their representation in these bodies is therefore biased against countries of the Southern hemisphere. Considering its population, economic progress and considerable political capital as well as nuclear power status, India strongly advocates the reform of these institutions to get a better representation in them. As concerning the second objective, this mantra has always been present in India foreign policy, the one of the NAM, the policy that claims the right to follow its own development path, the third ‘world way’. To Dubey (2008), for the implementation of these two priorities, the promotion of South-South cooperation is capital.

In its efforts to consolidate its status of emerging economy, India needs the world to shift its focus from internal problems of poverty and inequality to its role of a country able to provide aid to the needy. In this line, in 2003 the then Indian Minister of Finance, Jaswant Singh, decided to use development cooperation, that is turning the country from the status of ODA recipient to the one of ODA donor, to harness more international political influence Mthembu (2018). In this process, even though Indian financial assistance to African countries is still lower compared to China, it has however increased notably over the recent few years and New Delhi expects African countries to recall all of these when the time comes to vote for the reform the UN system and grant it a seat in an enlarged UN Security Council.

More, in launching the IBSA Initiative with Brazil and South Africa, India expects indirectly to meet its foreign policy goals by rallying all countries from South Asia, Africa and Latin America behind its International Agenda. The issue of trade serves as a case point. For Chakraborty et al. (2012), globalization has made it imperative for emerging countries and LDCs to enhance their bargaining power in international negotiations in
view of curbing the dominance of Western countries in global policy making. IBSA therefore seeks to become the “platform that can build a sustainable alliance to protect the interests of emerging economies in Asia, Africa and South America”. In fact, with the failure of the Doha Round which means the strengthening of trade barriers, developing countries’ interests are more at stake than those of Western countries. Looking at the issue from the specific angle of TRIPS and Public Health, WTO has indicated in 2005 that amendment of the provision on ‘compulsory licensing’ and parallel imports was possible provided more than 2/3 of member countries ratify it within two years. The amendment would lead to greater exports overtures of pharmaceutical products for India and Brazil. Since, developing countries have so far not succeeded in hitting the targeted number, IBSA perfectly serves the cause of coordinating the efforts of the global South in constructing a fairer international Public health order. Similarly, the EU-US joint draft, presented during the WTO Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003, crystallized the opposition of developing countries face to insignificant commitments from these two blocs of countries in lowering their agricultural subsidy within a certain period. India, but also China, played a key role in making the voice of the South heard concerning food and livelihood security as well as rural development concerns.

Again, on October 2, 2020, amidst the Covid-19 pandemics, India and South Africa made a joint submission to the Council of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of WTO, asking for an easing of intellectual property (IP) rules for Covid-19. For both countries, without an amendment of current rules, developing countries are likely not to benefit immediately from a vaccine when it will be available. This move led by India, that controls a significant share of the generic drug market in Africa, was actually echoing a communiqué of the African Union calling for the removal of all constraints pertaining to copyright, industrial designs, patents and the protection of undisclosed information or trade secrets to ensure an equitable access to any successful COVID-19 vaccine. Here, India is advocating for the implementation of the “Doha Declaration on public health by WTO members in 2001, which refers to the right to grant compulsory licenses — where a government can license the use of a patented invention without the consent of the patent-holder” (AP News, June 25, 2020). Like with HIV where Delhi, alongside South Africa, fought against the Western drug industry on the patent issue, India actions are meant to highlight its posture as a spokesperson of the Global South while securing market opportunities for its dynamic pharmaceutical industry.

Strategy

**Sovereignty, non-interference and no conditionality**

The cornerstone of both Chinese and Indian Africa’s policies is equality, mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs and absence of conditionality in the provision of aid. Actually, the notions of sovereignty and non-interference are not new concepts since they have always been at the base of both countries foreign policies. Furthermore, they represent the essence of China and India’s definitions of the very idea of state and international relations. They are not therefore peculiar to Africa.

By tying development assistance to political and economic reforms, Western donors’ conditionalities have seriously affected the sovereignty of African states. The Sino-Indian rhetoric about respect of sovereignty and non-interference posits that both countries do not have any paternalistic approach vis-a-vis Africa and helps both Asian drivers to brand themselves as an “appealing alternative to the West”. More important, in their attempt to distinguish themselves from the former colonial masters, both China and India make a point in stressing that no one but Africans themselves are entitled to choose the type of society they want to build. In the final analysis, we can say with Davies et al. (2008) that “the fact that aid is bilaterally negotiated and recipient countries feel that they determine what projects are required in line with their national development priorities […] perpetuates the feeling of ownership of the aid process amongst African leaders. Perceptions of the seemingly non-prescriptive nature of […] aid are complemented by the […] approach of underpinning aid with commercial incentives”.

The “Angola Model”

In April 2004, the Indian state owned ONGC Videsh signed an agreement with Shell to buy its 50% stake in offshore Block 18 offering $370 million for the transaction. The Angolan government refused to validate the deal and instead put it on sale where it eventually accepted a Sonangol Sinopec International (SSI), a joint venture between Sonangol and Sinopec bid worth $725 million coupled with $2.4 billion aid from China. The aid was to serve for the rebuilding of Angolan infrastructure road and rail infrastructure. The “Angola model” was born. Practically speaking, the “Angola Model” is a barter arrangement where commodities serve as collateral for the provision of low-interest loans.

This type of arrangement has become the standard way of doing business, mostly from Asian National Oil Companies (NOC) operating on the continent. Two main reasons can explain this fact. Sustained rises in oil prices and the fact that China, India and also South Korea have opted for securing long term provision of oil rather than relying on the international market have considerably enhanced the bargaining capacity of oil-producing countries, encouraging them to tighten state ownership and reduce foreign companies’ shares. Some African countries with poor infrastructure and willing to diversify
their economies, have therefore decided to make use of their new strong bargaining positions by conditioning preferential access to their oil and mineral sectors to companies whose government’s is willing to couple oil and mineral resources’ investments with investments in other sectors of the economy. It is in this light that a former Nigerian minister of state for petroleum has indicated that companies proposing attractive deal packages would be awarded rights of first refusal on oil blocks Downs (2007).

Major resources seeking deals signed in Africa by China are done on the “Angola Model” basis. This is the case with the China-DR Congo resources for infrastructures deal, a barter trade agreement whereby large infrastructure investments were to be provided by a Sino-Congolese joint venture, Sicomines, in exchange for access to concessions of copper and cobalt. The initial contract provided that the DRC would be provided with much-needed infrastructure, valued at US$ 6 billion but the deal was eventually revised Nola Nouck (2009). One of the biggest and spectacular deals under this scheme was recorded in 2010 when “OVL and CNOOC offered to joint Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) to make a $5 billion bid to secure Kosmos Energy’s stake in the Jubilee oil fields, one of the largest discoveries in West Africa in the last decade. GNPC choose to work with CNOOC as a result of $10.4 billion in loans for infrastructure projects and an additional $3 billion in loan for development of Ghana’s oil and gas sectors, all backed by Chinese banks. In comparison, the Indian government permits OVL to invest only in projects worth $75 million or less or is unable or perhaps unwilling to offer the kind of comprehensive financial packages that are often attached to Chinese bids” Biswas (2016).

Learning from its Angolan series of misfortunes, Indian public ONGC has teamed up with private steel maker Mittal in a joint-venture- ONGC Mittal energy - which has secured oil for infrastructure contract in Nigeria worth $6 billion under the “Angola Model”. The package includes a refinery, a power plant and railway lines. During the 2005-7 oil block bids, Indian companies OMEL, Sterling and Essar won six oil blocks in total.

**Differences**

Whether it is from the political, financial, human or cultural perspectives, both Asian countries’ approaches strategic partnerships with Africa differ significantly in terms of means mobilized in this effect.

**Political leverage**

**United Nations Security Council seat**

In its African safari, contrary to Delhi, Beijing has a major asset, a permanent seat in the UNSC it can resort to in support of a ‘friend’ in need. Sudan remains a case study in this regard. China has been blamed for undermining international community’s efforts to solve the Darfur crisis due to its enormous oil investments in the country.

Initially, Beijing has spared no effort in avoiding Sudan being sanctioned by the UNSC, “business is business. We try to separate business from politics. Secondly, I think the internal situation is an internal affair, and we are not in position to impose on them” Zhou Wenzhong, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in 2004 to justify Beijing’s reluctance to pressure Sudan over Darfur. Beijing’s position eventually evolved significantly. Chinese authorities have concluded that a strict idea of sovereignty was no longer tenable. They realized that by portraying the country as the “godfather” of Darfur killings, the ever-growing pressure of Western countries and activists would extremely affect the ‘responsible stakeholder’s’ reputation of the country, mostly at the eve of the Beijing Olympics; Moreover, many African countries also were starting to lose their patience over Khartoum’s hard stand on the issue. Through a strategy of ‘influence without interference’, the Chinese leadership then decided that instead of remaining observer, playing an active role in the resolution of this crisis would best serve China by avoiding that UN actions harm its oil interests. At the same time, appearing as the country that has convinced Sudan to accept a compromise would ensure a useful facelift to its international image.

However, it is clear that if the international community was right in pressuring China over the Darfur crisis for it obviously had huge economic leverage over Sudan, the general criticism ignored other countries such as India and Malaysia that were equally pumping oil in that country. India, contrary to China, that has always escaped the international scrutiny over its dealings in Sudan, is seriously handicapped by the absence of a permanent seat in the UNSC and the political weight as well as diplomatic prestige it carries. As a means of compensation, New Delhi makes it imperative to appear as the defender of developing countries’ interests in every international forum as exemplified by the WTO Doha Round in 2008. In addition, India also engage its African partners in socio-economic domains where it can demonstrate it relative strength as “partner of development” such as the campaign for the re-writing of intellectual property rights (IPR) in favor of all developing countries. The exports of generic drugs to treat HIV/AIDS are an indication of this ambition.

“Frequent flyer” travel diplomacy

If diplomacy goes hand in hand with symbolism, then China’s Africa diplomacy is the very expression of symbolism. For over 20 years now, it has become a tradition for the Chinese Foreign Minister to begin each year with a diplomatic tour of Africa. High-level leadership exchange visits represent the other major tool China
resort to in view of building personal leadership ties and strengthen bilateral relations in various areas. This includes regular annual trips by Chinese top figures to the continent such as Presidents Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Xingping as well as Premiers Wen Jiabao, Li Keqiang and other key leaders. As the former Angolan President Dos Santos revealed how much “he appreciated the fact that China assigns importance to Africa” (BBC Monitoring, June 21, 2006), African leaders, who also make frequent reciprocal visits to China, see this ‘frequent flyer travel’ diplomacy as an indication that for China, Africa really matters. In addition, a series of mid-lower level exchange visits are also organized on a regular basis. They include diplomats, economics officials, journalists and businesspersons as well as other decision-makers. Similarly, the China Communist Party (CCP) also extends invitations to African parliaments and political parties’ leaders. This is for Uhuru Kenyatta, “a clear indication that China is committed to Africa development agenda on the basis of a win-win partnership”

Here again, India initially lived in the shadow of China as it astonishingly lacked the political visibility carried by reciprocal high-level visits. In more than 60 years of independence, only two Prime Ministers have visited a key partner such as Nigeria. This was really a source of concern for Indian business circles for it is obvious that during these visits hurdles to major economic deals are addressed. More important, where China constantly reaffirmed its presence, the absence of India at the highest level might have been interpreted by African partners as New Delhi’s reluctance to long term commitment and comfort those who believed that India ventures in Africa were solely opportunistic, in other words that India only courted Africa for its votes at the UN. The matter was serious enough to make a former Foreign Secretary of the Government of India ask “how can African leaders take us seriously if our leaders are too busy to visit them? Mansingh (2009). On this front, India is clearly catching up. Tirumurti, the man in charge of India’s ties with Africa, declared on May 29, 2019 “there has been unprecedented intensification of our political engagement with Africa with 29 visits to African countries at the level of President, Vice President and Prime Minister apart from several Ministerial visits. These visits have been in both directions. Subsequent to the visit of 41 Heads of State/Heads of Government who attended IAFS-III, we have hosted over 35 leaders from Africa for various events in the last nearly five years.” He continued by saying that “Our engagement is not limited only to the bilateral political level. Today, India and Africa have comprehensive diplomatic mechanisms at all three levels - continental, regional and bilateral and through multilateral fora. In addition to Summits (IAFS I, II, III), we have had three meetings with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of Africa. We are looking at ways to enhance cooperation” (The Economic Times, May 29, 2019). Tirumurti was speaking at the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi within the framework of the Africa Day.

Chinese high visibility is confirmed on the ground by its large diplomatic network. Beijing has an embassy in every African country it has diplomatic with, that is almost in 44 countries. The only exception is Somalia due to obvious security reasons. Moreover, in 40 of these countries, Beijing has commercial counselor offices while it maintains eight consulates- general in eight countries. US Senate (2008). On this aspect, New Delhi has decided to increase the footprint of India's overseas presence while equally enabling the provision of better public services to the local Indian communities. On July 05, 2019, the Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced, while disclosing the budget, the opening of 18 new embassies in Africa to take the total to 47. The ultimate goal here is actually to push India’s diplomatic footprint as a rising power (The Economic Times, July, 05, 2019).

“Deep pockets” policy

Chinese financial engagements in Africa are far more important than Indian ones as reflected by trade figures. In 2018, China exchanged with the continent for $185 billion up from $155 billion in 2017 as compared to $62 billion recorded by India in 2018 with a notable 22% increase. In the investment front, China is also leading by far; they spoke at the first of a series of annual meetings of the African Development Bank (AfDB) in India in May 2017. Narendra Modi said the country has so far extended 152 lines of credits worth close to $8 billion to as many as 44 African countries. China has extended at least $5 billion each to Angola, Sudan and Nigeria. In Africa, China pursues a ‘deep pockets’ policy India cannot just follow for the simple reason that China SOEs, which enjoy a state financial support, are able to outbid competitors, namely Indian in this case, for the acquisition of contracts awarded by African governments. In one word, India is not yet in position to compete $ for $ with China for nearly each time Indian company has competed with a Chinese counterpart in Africa, it has lost. For instance, “In 2006, OVL again ran up against SSI as it made an aggressive bid of $1 billion for Angola’s deep water blocks 15(06), 16(06) and 18(06). SSI shocked the global markets by bidding $750 million for block 15(06) alone and a staggering $2.2 billion for blocks 17(06) and 18(06). Its total bid of $2.975 billion was nearly triple of that of OVL’s.” Where Indian companies managed to be successful in outbidding others players, Chand (2019) reveals that “the Indian government’s aversion to risk and inability to match favorable loans by the Chinese state has led to the unraveling of those deals” as the aforementioned Ghana experience suggest.

As the competition with China for African resources
will get tougher, India simply finds it very difficult to catch up with China and Indian businessmen are amongst the first to agree that reducing the gap with the Chinese will be hard if not simply impossible: "We are nearly five to seven years late," admits Prashant Ruia, CEO of Essar Group. "Competing with the Chinese is impossible, to be honest. They are building roads, airports and projects as a grant. They are taking a 20-year investment risk, something private companies like us cannot do. We do not have the kind of backing that the Chinese have, they are present on a much larger scale too. They have had a head start and have been there for the past 10 years" (Forbes India, May 24, 2010).

However, Indians are not the only victims of Chinese raids in Africa as indicated by Harry Broadman (2007), author of a World Bank study on China and India’s investments in Africa. "The Chinese have deep pockets. They have the ability to undercut and win every contract – and not just against India. It’s the US and Europe, too".

**Actors and agents**

**Public against private**

While majors’ operations carried out by China in Africa are conducted by big SOEs, those of India, except OMEL, are essentially mounted by private companies. This is actually what makes Indian ventures in Africa different from those of China. Private networks are what drove India’s relations with Africa, while government-to-government accords, at least initially, characterized the booster of Sino-Africa ties.

However, the picture of China central government directing companies where to invest and how much to put on the table is rapidly changing with more and more private entities taking initiatives. Actually, the phenomenon has become so complex that Beijing’s central government finds it difficult to control activities of these companies. According to McKinsey, nearly 90% of Chinese companies operating in Africa are private, therefore “calling into question the notion of a monolithic, state-coordinated investment drive”. McKinsey (2007) goes on in saying “Although state-owned enterprises tend to be bigger, particularly in specific sectors such as energy and infrastructure, the sheer number of private Chinese firms operating in Africa has been on the rise. These companies, therefore, introduce a new dimension to Chinese investment in Africa. In recent years, a significant number of smaller, state-owned enterprises have started operating in Africa, often in sectors such as finance and construction. This trend is likely to continue as China’s economy grows and more companies seek to expand their operations abroad”.

**Importation of workforce**

One advantage India enjoys against China in their African race, at least in the eyes of the general public, is that it does not export manpower to work on projects it finances. Sending thousands of Chinese workers to Africa is not well perceived by local populations because they feel they are deprived of employment opportunities that inevitably results in limited capacity building and technology transfer. Whether it is because of raw xenophobia or real charges of exploitation, this use of Chinese contract labor has already led to serious clashes in some parts of the continent (Zambia, Equatorial Guinea and Algeria).

On this issue, nobody actually knows about this feeling of resentment like the Indians. Actually, it is a similar resentment that nurtured the massive expropriation and expulsion they suffered in the 1970’s from Uganda. Capitalizing on this painful experience, Indian ventures tend to be more integrated into the local economy today and employ more Africans. Where Chinese public-led investments are often accused of not creating any added value to African economies, Indian private companies have partnered with African local companies. This practice can be useful in reducing the potential of another community backlash.

**A very active diaspora**

Indian large Diaspora represents an important channel of influence for Delhi’s engagement in Africa. Certain Indian families like the Madhvanis or the Methas, very active in Eastern Africa, have been in Africa for more than a century. Indian Diaspora therefore represents an excellent point entry for Indian business on the continent. Figures from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs indicate that 31 million Indians were living on the continent for generations now, are very familiar with the local political landscape and economic realities, key factors to any investment ventures. Their
good knowledge of the general business environment, job and skills requirements and well as internal production capabilities make them extremely useful when it comes to choose the location of a business. In Kenya and Uganda for instance, they are leading in the finance, industrial and real estate sectors. “Although their involvement in local politics is almost inexistent, they are part of strong and powerful lobbying groups. The case of the Gupta family in South Africa illustrates their weight in the country’s power circles” Samuel and thssane (2019).

Indians and Africans from Indian descent serve as an extraordinary unique business facilitator and thanks to this dynamic Diaspora, Broadman believes that Indian ventures have “a deeper infiltration into the macroeconomic fabric of the continent” while the Chinese essentially “operate as enclaves on the African continent” Broadman (2007).

Actually, the truth looks rather different. A report, commissioned by the Japanese External Trade Organization to a South Africa-based socio-economic, political and security risk research and consultancy firm, reveals that China’s diaspora living on the continent represents a strategic tool in supporting Beijing’s ventures in Africa. Although figures on the exact number of Chinese living in Africa are difficult to grasp with accuracy, it is believed that around one million of them are found across the continent. Thanks to the social dynamics that exists within every Chinese community abroad, a broad range of experts, professionals, students, businesspersons provide crucial information to Chinese intelligence agencies that is used to enhance the country’s influence in those countries. “Local Chinese expatriates are also active in local Chinese business associations and so-called friendship associations to a) leverage Chinese influence in such countries, b) undermine Taiwan’s economic influence in Africa and c) provide a source of information on local economic and business developments. These friendship associations promote constant contacts with the PRC, through trips, seminars or “good will” visits of African and Chinese dignitaries” (ERA, 2009).

**Soft power**

In the fierce battle for influence, powerful states resort to what is known as “structural power” to shape other’s states choices and options, that is, they manage to keep under control the conditions under which other states ‘decision-making process is carried out. This generally includes controlling the international agenda of issues to be considered. This can also be done in a ‘gentler’ way, that is bringing other states to do what one desires based on the appealing potential of its own values. This is what Joseph Nye has labeled ‘soft power’, or the ability to exercise influence through attraction rather than through coercion ‘hard power’. With regard to this, Nye (2002) declares, “there is a much bigger payoff in getting others to want what you want, and that has to do with the attraction of one’s ideas”.

In China, Hu Jintao considered that promoting the country’s soft power is an essential part of its “peaceful rise”. While addressing the 17th congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2007, he declared, “Culture has become more and more an important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength”. Therefore, China should “enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the peoples’ basic cultural rights and interests” (Xinhua News, October 15, 2007). As concerning Sino-Africa relation, China projects itself culturally particularly in the medical and education domains.

Chinese medical missions in Africa are the Chinese best ambassadors to win the heart of the common African people. They have been going to Africa for a long time now and are truly appreciated by populations. Due to their simplicity and readiness to work sometimes in very difficult conditions as well as and their closeness to their patients, people keep them in really higher esteem on the continent. While waiting for Delhi’s Pan African e-Network, specially its telemedicine dimension to deliver its full potential and let Africans enjoy the benefits of Indian progress in medicine, it will however take a lot to India to match China on this social terrain.

On the other hand, while taking 20-years investing risks, China has managed to make sure that part of the next generation of African leaders and elites will be China-friendly. The army of almost 30,000 Africans already trained in China rightly serves that purpose. “Calculating the influence of this academic training on future generations […] will be difficult to measure with any precision, but their experiences while in China certainly sensitize them to Chinese viewpoints and interests. In addition, they will possess the knowledge of the Chinese language, as well as Chinese society, culture, history and politics. Those who enter officialdom may be more accommodating of Chinese interests and demands. They will also share personal connections with former classmates and will move up professional hierarchies simultaneously². This appreciation from David Shambaugh on China efforts to train more students that are Asian equally holds for their African counterparts.

Even on this issue of capacity building where Indians claimed to have a relative advantage over China, Beijing is doing better. China is training far more Africans than do the Indians under their ITEC program. However, aware of the fact that training opportunities provided by India are simply too modest to stand any comparison with those of China, Delhi has equally stepped up its efforts in attracting young Africans by allocating more funds to capacity building. In this aspect, India is helping the African countries to bridge the digital divide with the launching of the 2nd phase of the Pan Africa e-Network.
project – e-VidhyaBharati and e-ArogyaBharati Network Project (E-VBAB), which aims to provide 5 years free tele-education to 4000 students, free medical education to 1000 doctors/nurses/paramedics and free medical consultancy. Also, During the last 4 years, 6 IT Centers were established in South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Lesotho, Ghana, Namibia and Tanzania; a CGARD Technology Centre in Madagascar; 7 Vocational Training Centers in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Zimbabwe, and Egypt. A Technology Centre was also established in Zimbabwe. Entrepreneurship Centers are being set up in some countries. Yet, where Beijing spends huge amounts of public money in scholarships, thousands of bright minds from African Continent come every year on self-financing basis to Indian Universities and colleges. For these young people, it is showing the world that Africa has the capacity to forge its own future (The Economic Times, May 29, 2019).

Qualitatively also, China is stepping up its efforts to better grasp African realities. Chinese authorities have particularly tasked some academic institutions and think tanks to enhance the research capacity on African issues. It is the case of Nanjing University (Nanjing), Zhejiang Normal University (Jin Hua) and East China Normal University (Shanghai). On the continent soil, Beijing and Pretoria have jointly set up the Center for Chinese Studies (CSC). Located at Stellenboch University in the Western Cape Province, it is the first institution entirely devoted to the study of China in Africa. Still, there are no records of any initiative taken at the governmental level in India to raise awareness of Africa in Indian academic circles.

In addition, the Confucius Institutes headquarters’ website indicates that 54 Confucius institutes have been already set up in Africa including 27 of them classified as “classrooms” in African existing universities. Even though it is still difficult to apprehend what role this spread of Confucius Institutes actually plays in an integrated China’s Africa policy, Beijing has adopted, alongside with its political and economic forays, a more formal posture on this issue. Delhi who claimed a ‘longstanding cultural impact’ on the continent is still to systematize its cultural projection. , While the results of the Chinese soft power projection are still to be seen, India is struggling to follow the path.

Finally, in the symbolic realm, China has spent $200 million to build the African Union headquarters in Addis Abeba that was handed over in 2002 officially as a gift, but surely for Chinaas an expression of its growing presence in Africa. However, this achievement was tarnished in 2018 when the French newspaper Le Monde published an investigation showing that “China, which also paid and built the computer network at the AU, allegedly inserted a backdoor that allowed it to transfer data. The hack was not detected until January 2017 when technicians noticed that between midnight and 2 am every night, there was a peak in data usage even though the building was empty. After investigating, it was found that the continental organization’s confidential data was being copied on to servers in Shanghai” (Quartz Africa, 2018).

CONCLUSION

Although the official discourse is that India is not going to Africa to compete with anyone, specifically China, the fact is that Indian economic and political offensives on the continent are conditioned by the China factor. Just to see how emphatically Indian officials try each time to distinguish their African policy from the Chinese’s one represents the best indication of this fixation about China. The fact that relations between both states are mainly characterized by conflict, harsh rhetoric, mutual mistrust embedded in diplomatic language as well as quest for regional and global power, clearly indicates that China and India are bound to develop and deepen conflictual relations. Consequently, their engagement in certain parts of the global world, notably in Africa, will logically be reigniting conflicts between them. Nevertheless, as seen, owing to huge costs associated with fighting a war against another rising power, the competing powers make use of soft power in view of keeping the rival’s ambitions under control. In this realm, “If India is compared with China in terms of economic ties with Africa; the former appears to have missed the opportunities offered by the huge untapped natural resources Africa is endowed with” Modi and Shekhawa (2009:33). However, how has India, with an important Diaspora living on the continent for many generations and whose commercial ties with Africa date back to the British colonial period, been outpaced by China in the race for Africa’s resources?

The fact is that should the Indian engagement in Africa to be motivated by its ambition to counter China, their respective national economic capabilities are actually the main determinants of their projections and successes in Africa. Though India is certainly achieving notable results in his quest for African natural resources, China, that is more industrialized with less poverty on shore, will continue to strengthen its stronghold as a leading Africa’s trading partner for a long time where it enjoys ten-year lead over India. For this reason, it is clear to us that in lieu of rivalry, India is battling to catch up. In this vein, its business model has certain parallels with Beijing’s one while, contrarily to China, sourcing workforce in Africa and not from India constitutes it most appealing ‘selling point’.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.
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